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It has been more than five years now 
that Chinese President Xi Jinping first 
referred to the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), or One Belt One Road as it was 
called at the time, during his visits to 
Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 
September 2013. Since then, the project 
has generated extensive intellectual 
curiosity among academics around the 
world, while policy-makers have sought 
to come up with the best possible policy 
response to reap the possible benefits of 
China’s grand strategy, which involves 
infrastructure development and 
investments to boost connectivity 
between Asia, Europe and Africa. The 
European Union (EU), for example, 
presented The European Way to 
Connectivity – A New Strategy on How 
to Better Connect Europe and Asia last 
September, in which the EU sets out 
the parameters under which in intends 
to engage in boosting connectivity 
between Europe and Asia. The strategy 
is by no means a rival to the BRI, but 
rather a reaffirmation of the EU’s own 
approach when it comes to connectivity 
projects. But Europe is not the only part 
of the world that is closely watching the 
evolution of China’s grand scheme. So 
does Southeast Asia and the Association 
of Southeast Asian countries (ASEAN), 
which is the focus of this policy brief. If 
observers argue that the BRI has 
created dividing lines between the EU 
member states, this is even more so 
among ASEAN countries. 
 
ASEAN occupies a central position in the 
strategy given its geographic proximity, 
infrastructure needs, and emerging markets. 
China has pledged to spur a radical 
transformation of the region by enhancing 
interconnectivity. And Chinese firms are now 
indeed involved in building new railways, roads, 
and ports across the region. Beijing’s aspirations, 
nevertheless, have also provoked controversy of 
late, and several regional states have grown 
concerned over rising Chinese political clout and 
the potential debt burden. 
At a superficial level, one may distinguish 
between three groups of ASEAN countries in 
terms of their approach to the BRI. 
MOST EAGER   
To begin with, the project appears to hold most 
appeal for ASEAN’s low-income and most 
capital-needy members, such as Laos, Cambodia 
and Myanmar. Not surprisingly, China benefits 
from the greatest margin of manoeuvre in 
negotiating with these countries, often resulting 
in the deployment of Chinese labour and 
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equipment during the project implementation 
phase. Given the relatively small size of these 
three economies and the sheer value of funds 
China is lending to them, there are significant 
concerns over indebtedness. For example, many 
have warned that Laos, which has recently seen 
its debt creep above 60% of GDP, will have 
difficulty paying off its share (20%) of a US$6 
billion (equal to nearly half the country's GDP) 
rail line being built between Kunming in 
Southern China and the Laotian capital of 
Vientiane. 
 
Myanmar also gave the green light in September 
last year to a batch of 24 projects worth an 
estimated US$2 billion by inking the China-
Myanmar Economic Corridor Agreement. 
These projects will form an integral part of the 
Y-shaped corridor that will connect Kunming to 
Yangon and Mandalay, Myanmar’s two major 
commercial cities, and a Special Economic Zone 
in Kyaukphyu. However, despite its general 
openness to Chinese loans, Myanmar has already 
demonstrated its preparedness to pull the plug 
on Chinese-backed projects before. In 2011, 
then President Thein Sein of Myanmar 
suspended the $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project 
due to pressure from local and national activists 
provoked by the planned displacement of 
thousands as well as the dam’s potentially huge 
impacts on agriculture and fish downstream. 
Myanmar also decided, in August 2018, to scale 
back the initial US$7.3 billion price tag on the 
Kyauk Pyu deepwater port, on the western tip 
of Myanmar’s conflict-torn Rakhine state, due to 
debt fears. 
 
NEEDY BUT ASSERTIVE  
In the middle of the spectrum are countries such 
as Vietnam, Thailand or Singapore (though for 
different reasons given the level of development 
of the city state). These countries generally take 
a more assertive stance in negotiating the terms 
of BRI undertakings with China, but are still 
welcoming the overall scheme. Vietnam is, for 
example, in dire need of infrastructure 
investments, but the country’s positioning on 
the BRI is complicated by the political, 
economic, and strategic relationship between the 
two countries (e.g. the South China Sea dispute). 
As for Thailand, the country’s government has 
been wrangling, ever since Prime Minister 
Prayut’s military regime first took power, with 
their Chinese counterparts over the financial 
terms and land rights along the proposed track 
of an 873-kilometer high-speed line that is 
intended to connect Thailand’s east coast ports 
and industrial zones to Kunming traveling 
through neighbouring Laos. Following the initial 
target of March 2018, the project is now 
expected to be completed by 2023 according to 
the most optimistic scenario. The slow pace and 
troublesome nature of negotiations were also 
believed to be contributing factors to premier 
Prayut’s absence at the Belt and Road Forum 
staged in Beijing and attended by various global 
leaders in May 2017. 
 
As for Singapore, the city state first embraced 
the BRI as a means of improving its rapport 
with China after the relationship of the two hit 
rock-bottom in 2016-2017, due largely to 
Singapore's positioning on the South China Sea 
territorial disputes. Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong’s absence from the above-mentioned 
BRI forum still provoked speculation that the 
city-state would, at best, have a negligible role to 
play in  China’s grand strategy. However, PM 
Lee’s visit to China later that year, followed by 
his meeting with President Xi Jinping at the 
Boao Forum for Asia in April 2018, suggested 
that cooperation between the two countries was 
restored. Singapore has since then re-emerged as 
a valuable partner for China in three areas: as a 
financing hub, a source for third-country 
partnerships, and an arbitration hub for the BRI. 
Nonetheless, as a nation dominated by a 
Chinese ethnic majority, Singapore is cautious 
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not to present itself as too amicable towards 
China in order to avoid being seen by the 
People’s Republic as a natural ally. 
 
RETICENT  
In the past two years, Malaysia, and to a lesser 
extent the Philippines and Indonesia, have 
demonstrated the most cautious attitude 
towards the BRI. Once the foremost proponent 
of BRI projects in the region, Malaysia is now 
leading the regional charge against BRI-related 
investments. The new administration led by 
Mahathir Mohamad has deferred two gas 
pipeline projects worth US$2.3 billion and the 
US$20 billion East Coast Rail Line amid 
concerns over Malaysia’s finances. 
 
In October 2016, China pledged to invest 24 
billion US$ in the Philippines, including 9 billion 
in loans and 15 billion in direct investment. 
These investments have, however, barely 
materialised. While some have argued that this 
was due to the Philippines’ previous position on 
the Hague tribunal verdict that rejected Chinese 
claims based on its ‘nine-dash line’, most 
cancellations and delays occurred primarily due 
to factors in the host state. For example, a 
hydropower project by Power China Guizhou 
and Philippines Greenergy Development Corp 
ran into problems obtaining funds from 
shareholders given the uncertainty regarding the 
recently signed Bangsamoro Basic Law that 
grants a high level of autonomy, including some 
aspects of sharia law, to the Muslim areas of the 
southern Philippines. Nonetheless, since his 
election in 2016, President Duterte has sought 
to intensify bilateral relations with China. A 
practical manifestation thereof was the inking of 
29 agreements (concerning mainly infrastructure 
projects) during the official visit of President Xi 
Jinping to Manila in November 2018, which may 
very well inject more dynamism into the bilateral 
relationship.  
 
Finally, despite it being the largest ASEAN 
economy, Indonesia has not been among the 
major beneficiaries of China's BRI. Its flagship 
project is a joint venture to build and operate 
the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway. 
Announced in October 2015, the project was,  
however, bogged down until recently, owing to 
issues ranging from funding to land acquisition. 
In general, Indonesia favours a business-to-
business structure for its BRI deals, seeking to 
avoid government-to-government loans. Jakarta 
is also keen on ensuring that Chinese-backed 
projects employ Indonesian workers and rely on 
the most advanced environmentally friendly 
technology. 
 
ALTERNATIVE SOURCES 
As ASEAN states grow increasingly wary of 
BRI projects, alternative donors step forward to 
boost their investment and trade with the 
region, to the detriment of Beijing. Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahatir has, for example, paid 
three visits to Japan in just seven months since 
his election, repeatedly courting Japanese 
investors in an attempt to move away from 
China. Tokyo has also recently vowed to 
increase its presence in the Mekong sub-region 
by expanding development aid and technical 
programmes. The Indonesian government has 
also sought to avoid being overly exposed to 
Chinese loans and, building on a long tradition 
of Japanese investment in the country, has 
invited Japan to work on the 600 km medium-
high speed railway between Jakarta and 
Surabaya. 
 
Though to a lesser extent, India has also come 
forward with its own offers for the region. 
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s tour to 
Southeast Asia in May 2018, he pledged to 
intensify trade and investment with the region. 
An agreement was reached with Indonesia over 
the development of a port on the island of 
Sabang which has a strategic location near the 
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maritime corridor of the Strait of Malacca. In 
addition, New Delhi has also committed to 
intensifying its ties with the Mekong sub-region, 
pledging involvement in the development of the 
healthcare sector in Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Vietnam during a business conclave in Phnom 
Penh in May last year. 
 
In a broader sense, Chinese expansion through 
the BRI has also provoked discussions between 
Japan, India, the US and Australia on the 
possible establishment of a rival joint regional 
infrastructure scheme. These discussions, in 
turn, have given rise to Chinese anxiety about 
the birth, or rebirth, of the ‘Quad’ as a polarising 
alliance dedicated to China’s containment 1.  The 
Quad has also come to be seen as the main 
proponent of the Indo-Pacific concept – a 
geographic concept that spans the two regions 
of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 
China has thus far been reluctant to embrace the 
concept: already frustrated with the US’s 
inclusion in the Asia-Pacific concept, India’s 
emergence in the equation risks to further 
diminish China’s own centrality. 
 
The BRI is therefore not the only game in town. 
And the challenge for ASEAN in dealing with 
the strategy does not only lie in avoiding debt 
trap scenarios, but also in finding ways of 
navigating the waters of what seems to be an 
unfolding contest between the ’Big Neighbour’ 
and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The idea of close military cooperation between these four countries dates back to the aftermath of 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. While the concept eventually failed to gain traction, some now 
argue that it is being reborn as a more overtly strategic response to China’s new assertiveness in the 
Indo-Pacific, and in particular the South China Sea. 
